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ABSTRACT 
Family ownership, liquidity, and insider trading in new public firms 
Lora Dimitrova 
IPOs have long been considered as a potential way of exit for founders. Yet the 
existing literature has largely failed to examine .founders' exit decisions and its influence 
on both the firm's information environment and the liquidity of its stock. In this paper, 
using a sample of new public firms, we examine founders' sales in the open market and 
relate them to the level of information asymmetry and various aspects of the liquidity of 
the firm's stock. We find that family ownership has a significant influence on the extent 
of founders' exit. In particular, founders with low (high) levels of ownership are more 
(less) likely to engage in sale transactions, indicating relatively faster (slower) exit. We 
also find that, in order to facilitate their exit, founders try to improve the market liquidity 
by engaging in additional information disclosure. This is reflected in the negative relation 
between the level of firm asymmetric information in the equity market and the extent of 
founders' sales. While the lower level of asymmetric information appears to translate into 
lower adverse selection risk, the founder trading patterns increase inventory risk for the 
market maker, leading to a wider bid-ask spread. 
in 
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1. Introduction 
As pointed out by Schwert (1985), the founder is probably the most important 
asset of a firm in its formative stage. Since the firm does not have an established 
reputation yet, it has to rely heavily on founders' reputation. In addition, founders usually 
own a significant fraction (majority) of a firm's equity and are actively involved in the 
management and governance of their firms. At the same time, founding family's loyalty 
to the firm may not have been established yet (compared to the case of a firm which has 
been a family firm for decades). Therefore founders' exit is a real possibility. In fact, as 
reported by Stein (2001), eighty percent of family firms never make it to the second 
generation. IPO is a crucial step in the evolution of a family firm into a public 
corporation and in the separation of ownership and control. 
In many cases, however, IPOs are also exit vehicles for founders. Despite the 
importance of founders in the new public family firms, and the potential influence of 
founders' exit on their firm's current and future performance, there is surprisingly little 
evidence on this important transition in a firm's life. While some of the studies that 
examine the evolution of ownership and board characteristics in new public firms have 
documented the evolution of the founders' presence in the firm (see, e.g., Boone et al., 
2007), we are not aware of any study that has explicitly examined either the determinants 
or the ways founders exit new public firms. In this paper, using a unique, hand-collected 
data on the evolution of ownership in new public firms from IPO up to seven years after 
1
 See, e.g., Brennan and Franks (1997). 
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the IPO, we examine not only the determinants, but also the influence of founders' exit 
on both the firm's information environment and the liquidity of its stock.2 3 
We hypothesize that the extent of founders' exit will be influenced by, among 
other things, their ownership positions.4 In particular, we expect ownership to have two 
opposing effects on the extent of founders' exit. On the one hand, high levels of 
founders' ownership indicate their intention to remain with the firm for the long-run and 
this can be seen as a reflection of their loyalty to the firm ("loyalty effect"). On the other 
hand, to the extent that a higher ownership position in the firm means a lower level of 
diversification, founders may trade their shares purely for diversification reasons. 
Therefore, ownership may also have a positive influence on the extent of founders' exit 
("diversification effect"). The relative dominance of these two effects at particular levels 
of ownership is an empirical issue. Our results suggest a concave relation between the 
extent of founders' exit and ownership. In other words, founders with low levels of 
ownership engage in more extensive sell transactions than do founders with high levels of 
ownership, indicating that the loyalty (diversification) effect dominates at high (low) 
levels of ownership. 
We also find that the extent of founders' exit influences both the firm's 
information environment and the liquidity of its stock. An examination of the relation 
between the extent of founder exit and the level of asymmetric information about the firm 
in the equity market reveals that firms with low levels of family ownership (i.e., those 
2
 The paper closest to ours is that by Cao et al. (2005). They examine insider trading around lock-up 
expirations. Their focus, however, is on the 30-day period following the lock-up expiration. In addition, 
they do not explicitly examine the differences between various types of insiders. 
3
 Since most founders in our sample exit over a relatively long period of time, we have chosen to use 
continuous measures of exit (rather than a discreet dummy variable). This choice of measures allows us to 
examine not only the decision to exit, but also the influence of the exit process on both the information 
environment and the firm's liquidity. 
4
 For now onwards, ownership will refer to family ownership. 
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with the highest extent of founders' exit) have the lowest level of information asymmetry. 
This finding is consistent with the predictions of Hong and Huang (2005) who argue that 
the firms with the highest level of insider trading will engage in more extensive investor 
relations, thus decreasing the level of information asymmetry about their firms. 
The influence of the lower level of asymmetric information on the bid-ask spread, 
however, remains unclear. The market microstructure literature views bid-ask spreads as 
the sum of three different costs incurred by the market maker: inventory cost, order 
processing cost, and adverse selection cost. While a lower level of asymmetric 
information can lead to a decrease in the adverse selection cost faced by the market 
maker, the founders' transactions themselves can have a significant influence on both the 
adverse selection and inventory cost components of the bid-ask spread. In particular, 
founders who are timing their sell transactions tend to sell at a higher price and their sells 
are followed by price declines. Their transactions will therefore, increase adverse 
selection costs of trading. At the same time, founders who are not timing the market will 
create higher inventory costs for the market maker. 
We find a convex (concave) relation between the adverse selection (inventory) 
costs of trading and family ownership. This implies that founders with high levels of 
ownership may be timing the market, while founders with low levels of ownership are 
less likely to do so. Consistent with this, our examination of founders' timing ability 
reveals a convex (concave) relation between the pre-trade (post-trade) performance and 
ownership. In other words, founders with low levels of ownership tend to sell after a 
(relatively) smaller price increase and their sales are followed by an increase in the stock 
From now onwards the term "information asymmetry" will refer to the information asymmetry between 
firm insiders and outsiders, while "adverse selection" will refer to the information asymmetry between 
informed traders in the market and the uninformed market maker. 
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price (potentially due to their exit). Founders with high levels of ownership, however, 
tend to sell after a (relatively) larger price increase and their sales are followed by a price 
decline. 
The relative importance of the two influences on the bid-ask spread (influence of 
lower information and influence of trading itself) is an empirical question. Our findings 
suggest that the inventory concerns seem to dominate adverse selection issues over the 
entire range of ownership, therefore these concerns are the main driving forces driving 
the observed concave relation between the bid-ask spread and ownership. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 develops the hypothesis that will serve as the basis for the empirical tests. 
Section 4 discusses the sample characteristics, while section 5 describes the methodology 
and reports the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
This paper is related and contributes to several areas of research: family firms, 
insider trading, and market liquidity. 
2.1 Family firm literature 
Founding families represent a unique group of active, long-term owners, holding 
concentrated equity positions in their firms. Although family firms have recently started 
to receive attention in the academic literature, most of this emerging literature has 
focused on mature and index-listed family firms (see, among others, Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In their paper, Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine 
the effects of family control, ownership, and management on firm value. However, they 
4 
acknowledge that their estimates of the relative importance of family firms are likely to 
be conservative because the firms in their sample are among the largest in the world, are 
listed on an exchange in a country with a high degree of shareholder protection, are 
frequently included in the index funds, and are generally mature and thus more difficult 
to maintain under family control. Anderson and Reeb (2003) explore the relation between 
founding-family ownership and firm performance, and observe that, ^contrary to their 
expectations, family firms perform better than non-family firms. Nevertheless, they also 
focus their attention only on large and mature companies that are part of Standard & 
Poor's 500 index. 
New public family firms, on the other hand have received very little attention.6 It 
is in these firms that the costs and benefits of family ownership are likely to be more 
pronounced. Our conjecture is based on the following three reasons. First, for new public 
firms, the founding family is likely to own a significant fraction (majority) of its equity 
and exert a more significant and direct influence on the firm (either positive or negative) 
than it would at the mature stage. Second, their ownership is usually concentrated in the 
hands of a single individual (as opposed to a group of top managers). Third, as shown by 
Paeglis and Tirtiroglu (2008), new public family firms are less likely to be the subject of 
monitoring and scrutiny by various financial market participants (such as financial 
analysts and institutional investors), allowing the founding family a more unhindered 
control over the firm. 
6
 The only papers dealing explicitly with new public family firms that we are aware of are those by Paeglis 
and Tirtiroglu (2008) and Basu, Dimitrova, and Paeglis (2008). 
5 
2.2 Insider trading literature 
Several studies have examined the performance of insider trades. In their paper 
Eckbo and Smith (1998) use three different measures of performance and document zero 
or negative abnormal performance of insider trading. Further, they find evidence that the 
average mutual fund outperforms insider portfolios. Other studies on the profitability of 
insider trading show the opposite results. Seyhun (1986) finds that insiders purchase 
stock prior to an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell stock prior to an abnormal decline 
in stock prices. In addition, the study also finds that the loss incurred by market makers 
due to their trading with insiders is negatively related to firm size. Therefore, market 
makers would face higher percentage losses when trading with insiders from small firms. 
This is consistent with the fact that smaller firms are associated with wider bid-ask 
spreads.7 Markarian and Bricker (2007) find a negative relation between the presence of 
institutional investors (and their monitoring efforts) and insider trading profitability. 
2.3 Market microstructure literature 
There is growing literature that examines the empirical relation between insider 
trading and market liquidity. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) show that the presence of 
traders with superior information leads to wider bid-ask spreads. Market makers are 
compensated for their anticipated losses to informed traders by widening the spread. In 
related literature, Copeland and Galai (1983) find that bid-ask spread increases with price 
volatility and the price level of the assets being traded, and decreases with trading 
volume. 
7
 See also Baesel and Stein (1979) and Jaffe (1974). 
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While the aforementioned papers study the impact of informed trading on 
liquidity, their findings are consistent with those of papers examining the impact of 
insider trades on liquidity. Cornell and Sirri (1992) test the market reaction to informed 
trading using the post-court records of the individual insider transactions of informed 
group of people who traded on information leaked prior to the announcement of the 
acquisition of Campbell Taggart by Anheuser-Busch. They conclude that trading volume 
and liquidity increase when insiders are active. Similarly, when studying the cross-
sectional association between bid-ask spreads and insider trading, Chung and 
Charoenwong (1998) find that market makers widen the spread for stocks with greater 
extent of insider trading. In their time-series analysis, the authors, however, do not find 
evidence of changes in the spread. They conclude that since the market makers are 
generally unable to predict the exact timing of insider trading, they protect themselves by 
maintaining larger spreads for stocks with greater extent of insider trading. 
Other studies employ different liquidity measures, such as the bid-ask spread and 
trading volume, to test for the change in liquidity before and after an anticipated or 
unanticipated information event (see, e.g., Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986; Krinsky and 
Lee, 1996; Chae, 2005). Examining earnings and dividend announcements, Venkatesh 
and Chiang (1986) find that market makers widen the spread only around unanticipated 
earnings announcements (that is, those that are separated from a previous announcement 
by more than ten days but less than thirty days). According to Krinsky and Lee (1996), 
although earnings announcements result in increased adverse selection costs, they may 
have an insignificant impact on the total bid-ask spread due to the simultaneous decrease 
in inventory and order processing costs. Chae (2005) shows that trading volume 
7 
decreases prior to scheduled announcements, and increases after the announcements. 
Further, trading volume is negatively related to the level of information asymmetry prior 
to an announcement. Although, the author finds that volume significantly increases 
before an unscheduled announcement, this result cannot be explained by the level of 
information asymmetry. 
Lockup expirations after IPOs are alsos seen as attractive events for testing the 
significance of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. In their paper, 
Cao, Field, and Hanka (2005) study the pre-announced, large-scale entry of possibly 
informed traders into the equity markets around IPO lockup expirations and the resulting 
changes in share price and trading volume. They find that even though lockup expirations 
are associated with higher than usual level of insider trading, they have little effect on the 
bid-ask spread. In contrast, market depth and trading activity improve substantially. The 
authors argue that the improved liquidity is probably caused by the fact that the expected 
losses due to insider trading are small relative to the other costs of making a market and 
therefore have little effect on bid-ask spread and quoted depth. 
Finally, several previous papers investigate the effect of ownership stake on 
market liquidity. For example, Sarin et al. (2000) show that fractional ownership of 
insiders and institutions is positively related to spreads and negatively related to quoted 
depths. However, while the loss of liquidity stemming from higher insider ownership is 
due to a higher adverse selection cost, the observed result is caused by higher inventory 
cost, in the case of higher institutional ownership. Heflin and Shaw (2000) provide 
similar evidence that firms with greater blockholder ownership (entities holding at least 
5% of a firm's outstanding shares), either by managers or external parties, are associated 
8 
with larger spreads and adverse selection components of the spread and with smaller 
quoted depths. On one hand, blockholders aid in the process of price discovery by 
monitoring the firm, and thereby reduce adverse selection problems. In turns this should 
lead to narrower bid-ask spreads. On the other hand, the market maker may regard 
blockholders as informed traders, based on their access to valuable firm-relevant 
information, and therefore widen the spread. The authors' results support the second 
argument, suggesting that higher blockholder ownership is associated with higher adverse 
selection costs of trading and therefore lower liquidity. In contrast, Kini and Mian (1995) 
find opposing evidence when they examine the relation between bid-ask spreads and 
ownership structure. Their findings suggest that there is a negative relation between bid-
ask spreads and institutional holdings and that the relation between spreads and insider 
holdings is never positive. Similarly, Dennis and Strickland (2003) report that changes in 
liquidity are negatively related to the level of institutional ownership when they examine 
the effect of stock splits on liquidity. 
While a large body of literature has studied the relationship between ownership 
and liquidity, to our knowledge the only study that looks at the relationship between 
family ownership and liquidity is that by Attig et al. (2006). Using a sample of Canadian 
firms, the authors investigate the effect of ultimate control and ownership on stock 
liquidity, measured by the bid-ask spread. They find that family firms with greater 
difference between control (voting) and cash flow rights have higher agency costs, which 
o 
lead to wider bid-ask spreads and lower stock liquidity. 
They, however, do not examine if the liquidity of the stock depends on the fraction of the firm's equity 
owned by the founding family. 
9 
3. Theory and hypotheses 
Consider founders deciding upon the extent of their exit from a new public family 
firm. We hypothesize that their decision will be influenced by, among other things, their 
ownership positions. In particular, we expect the ownership to have two opposing effects 
on the extent of founders' exit. First, founders' ownership indicates their intentions to 
remain with the firm for the long-run, and this can be seen as a reflection of their loyalty 
to the firm. This implies a negative relationship between the extent of founders' exit and 
ownership. From now on, we will refer to this negative relationship as the "loyalty 
effect". Second, if high ownership position in the firm means a lower level of founders' 
diversification, ownership may have a positive influence on the extent of founder exit. In 
other words, founders may trade for purely diversification reasons. From now on we will 
refer to this positive influence of ownership on the extent of founders' exit as the 
"diversification effect". 
For a founder with very low level of ownership, the loyalty effect is likely to be 
low, and so is the diversification effect. As the level of ownership increases, so will both 
effects. While the dominance of one effect over the other remains an empirical matter, we 
hypothesize that at some point the loyalty effect will start to dominate the diversification 
effect. For a founder with a high level of ownership, on the other hand, the loyalty effect 
will dominate the diversification effect. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The relation between the extent of founder exit and ownership should 
be non-linear and concave. 
10 
Founders' ability to sell their shares in the open market, however, depends upon 
the liquidity of the firm's shares.9 In a recent paper, Hong and Huang (2005) argue that 
investor relations can be used by insiders to decrease the level of asymmetric information 
about the firm in the equity market thereby increasing liquidity of firm's stock and 
making it easier for insiders to sell their shares.10 The above arguments lead to two 
predictions. First, if founders indeed use investor relations to increase the liquidity of 
firm shares, the relation between the level of asymmetric information and ownership 
should be the inverse of that observed between ownership and the extent of founders' 
exit. Second, firms with higher intensity of founders' exit should have the lowest level of 
asymmetric information. These two predictions form the basis of our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2A: The relation between the level of asymmetric information about the 
firm in the equity market and ownership should be the inverse of the relation between 
ownership and the extent of founders' exit. 
Hypothesis 2B: There should be a negative relation between the extent of founders' 
exit and the level of asymmetric information about the firm in the equity market. 
We now turn to the liquidity implications of insider trading. The market 
microstructure literature views the bid-ask spread as the sum of three different costs 
incurred by the market maker: inventory cost, order processing cost, and adverse 
selection cost. The inventory cost arises because the market maker is forced to hold a 
non-diversified portfolio, which exposes the market maker to non-systematic risks (see, 
9
 The SEC Rule 144, for example, caps what an insider who holds restricted stock can sell over a three-
month period at the greater of one percent of the number of shares outstanding or the average weekly 
trading volume over the four weeks preceding the sale (see, e.g., Kahl et al., 2003). 
10
 Hong and Huang (2005) define investor relations as "activities [that] include voluntary information 
disclosures, competition for analyst coverages, and interactions with investors for the purpose of expanding 
the shareholder base". In addition, the authors argue that the benefits from investor relations should be 
more pronounced in the new public firms such as those examined in this paper. 
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Demsetz, 1968; Ho and Stoll, 1981). The market maker incurs the order-processing cost 
in the process of making the market for a given security. The adverse selection cost 
results from the information asymmetry between informed traders in the market and the 
uninformed market maker. While the decrease in the level of asymmetric information 
can lead to a decrease in the adverse selection costs of trading (see, e.g., Kyle, 1985), the 
timing of founders' transactions may have a significant influence on both the adverse 
selection cost of trading and the inventory costs of the market maker. In particular, if 
founders are good at timing their sales, their trading will increase the importance of 
adverse selection concerns of the market makers (relative to their inventory concerns). 
Consider the following example. Suppose the founders sell during an upward 
trend of the firm's stock price. By timing their trades to immediately precede the stock 
price decline, founders are creating an adverse selection concern for the market maker 
because the latter will be facing a loss due to the decline in the value of the shares they 
acquired from the founders. If, on the other hand, founders are not timing their trades 
(i.e., if they trade with the market), they will increase the relative importance of the 
inventory concerns of the market maker. This stems from the fact that by trading with the 
market the founders sells at a time when other investors do so. Thus, their selling is likely 
to increase the market makers' inventory and therefore their inventory holding costs. 
Market makers will therefore widen the bid-ask spread to reflect these higher inventory 
costs. This leads to our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The better the timing of founders' trades, the higher the adverse 
selection cost of trading and the lower the inventory costs of the market maker. 
12 
Finally, since the influence of information asymmetry on the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread ("information asymmetry effect") and the influence of 
trading itself ("trading effect"), either due to adverse selection or inventory concerns, are 
expected to work in opposite directions, the overall effect of the founders' trading on the 
bid-ask spread is an empirical matter. Our fourth and last hypothesis, therefore, is as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 4: The relation between the ownership and the bid-ask spread should 
reflect the relative importance of the information asymmetry effect and trading effect. 
4. Data and sample selection 
The list of IPOs of common equity between 1993 and 1996 is from the 
SDC/Platinum New Issue database. We eliminate REITs, closed-end funds, unit 
offerings, equity carve-outs, financial (all firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999), and foreign firms. This screening leaves us with a sample of 1,554 firms. We 
then exclude previous leveraged buyouts and roll-ups (a total of 91 firms). There are 12 
firms, which are not found in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database. For an additional three firms, the CRSP and the SDC databases show different 
first dates of trading. The elimination of these leaves us with a total of 1,448 firms. 
We next classify the firms as either family or non-family, based on the 
information in the management sections of IPO prospectuses. Finally, we eliminate firms 
listed on exchanges other than NASDAQ. As shown by Affleck-Graves et al (1994), the 
relative importance of various components of the bid-ask spreads varies across different 
exchanges. Therefore, to avoid any confounding effects of due to these differences, we 
are examining only the NASDAQ-listed firms. Of the initial 1,448 firms, 777 that are 
13 
classified as NASDAQ-listed family firms represent our final sample.11 We collect the 
family ownership data for these firms at the time of IPO and from the first, third, fifth, 
and seventh proxy statements after the time of going public. The distribution of our final 
sample over time is described in Panel A of Table 1. By the time of the seventh proxy 
statement after the IPO, only 353 of the initial 777 firms are still publicly-listed. Founder 
.trading data is obtained from SEC form 4 filings. Panel B of Table 1 presents the 
distribution of founder trades over the seven year period after the initial public offering. It 
is interesting to note that, consistent with IPOs being an exit vehicle, most of founders' 
sales take place between the 1st and the 3rd proxy statement after public listing. 
The accounting data used in the paper comes from COMPUSTAT. The stock 
price data is retrieved from the CRSP. The analysts' coverage data is from IBES. 
Intraday transactions data are obtained from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. To be 
included in our sample, the stock's price must be within $5 and $999. This filter is 
applied to avoid the influence of extreme price levels. Trades that are out of sequence, 
recorded before the market open or after the market close, are also discarded. Several 
other filters are also employed to ensure the validity of the TAQ data.12 
11
 We define a firm as a "family firm" if its founder is actively involved in either its management, 
governance, or both. We acknowledge, however, that there are other possibilities for a founders' (or a 
family member's) involvement, such as a senior manager and a member of the board of director. 
12
 We drop all trades with a correction indicator other than 0 or 1, and retain only those trades for which the 
condition is B, J, K, or S. We also drop all trades with non-positive trade size or price. Finally, we omit all 
trades recorded before opening time or after the closing time of the market. Negative bid-ask spreads and 
transaction prices are also eliminated. In addition, we eliminate all quotes for which the quoted spread is 
greater than 20% of the quote midpoint when the quote midpoint is greater than $10, or for which the 
quoted spread is greater than $2 when the quote midpoint is less than $10. We also eliminate all quotes for 
which either the ask or the bid moves by more than 50%. Since no reliable method can exclude auto-quotes 
in TAQ, only BBO (best bid or offer) eligible primary market (NYSE) quotes were used (Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam 2001). Thus, we exclude all quotes with condition 5, 7, 8, 9, 11,13,14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 
20, 27, 28, 29. 
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As discussed above, our paper consists of two parts. From now onwards, we will 
refer to the first part, examining the relation between ownership, the level of asymmetric 
information, and the extent of founder exit, as the "panel data part of the paper". We will 
refer to the second part, examining the timing and profitability of founders' trading, as 
the "event data part of the paper". For the event data part, we aggregate founders' sales at 
a daily level. We define the day of a sale as date 0 and define our pre-event and post-
event windows, relative to that date. Our sample for the event data part consists of all 
events with non-overlapping event windows. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables used in our empirical tests. In 
particular, Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics of variables we use for the panel 
data part of the paper. The average (median) family ownership in our sample is 22.7% 
(15.9%). The average (median) market capitalization of our sample firms is $321 ($95) 
million, while the average (median) idiosyncratic volatility of the firm's stock is 4.8% 
(4.5%). The average number of sales is 2.22 and the average percentage of shares sold is 
0.5% of firm's outstanding shares. 
In Panel B of Table 2 we report the summary statistics of the variables we use in 
the event data part of the paper. The average (median) of the equity stake of the family is 
18.6% (12.0%).13 The average (median) market capitalization of the firms is $908 ($324) 
million. 
13
 The difference between these values and those reported above for the full sample seems to suggest a 
higher trading frequency for low family ownership firms. We will explore this observation in detail in the 
following sections. 
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5. Empirical tests and results 
This section describes the methodology and reports the results of our empirical 
tests. In Section 5.1 we examine the relation between ownership and the extent of 
founders' exit. In Section 5.2 we report our findings about the relation between 
information asymmetry and ownership. Finally, the relation between the extent of 
founders' exit and the liquidity of the firm's stock are explored in Section 5.3. 
5.1 The extent of founders' exit and ownership 
We start our analysis by examining the relation between ownership and the extent 
of a founders' selling in the open market. We do so by estimating the following 
regression: 
FEXITU = #, + 0lFAMOWNil_l + P2FAMOWNSQH_x + fcWEDGE,,^ + ^ LMKTU_X 
+ j35RSDil_l+j3kYEAR_DUMMIESlt_l+si ^ ) 
We measure the extent of founders' exit, FEXIT, in two ways. The first measure, 
%_SOLD, is the number of shares sold by the founder as a percentage of the shares 
outstanding. The second measure, LSELL, is the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of sell transactions executed by each founder. The extent of founders' sales 
influences their ownership positions. Therefore, causality cannot be inferred if the two 
variables are contemporaneously measured. As a result, we have chosen to measure 
ownership at the time of the proxy statement and the extent of founders' exit over the 
following one- or two- year period (i.e., until the next proxy statement for which there is 
available ownership data). To allow for non-linearity in the relation between ownership 
and the extent of founders' exit, we use a quadratic specification. FAMOWN is the 
percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the founding family, as reported in the proxy 
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statement. FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. WEDGE is the difference 
between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by the family. LMKT is the natural 
logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm, measured on the day before the proxy 
statement filing date.14 RSD is the standard deviation of the market model residual, 
calculated over 250 trading days ending on the day before the proxy filing date. We also 
control for a possible time trend jn the market, by using year dummies. 
In contrast to mature family firms, the founders' loyalty to the new public firm 
may not have been established yet, and therefore founders' exit can be a real possibility. 
A potential exit strategy for founders is to sell their shares in the open market. In our first 
hypothesis (HI), we conjecture that founders' choice to exit through trading would 
depend on the level of ownership. In particular, we expect the coefficient estimates of Pi 
to be positive and the coefficient estimate of P2 to be negative. 
The results are reported in Table 3. We find that the coefficient estimate for pi is 
positive, while the coefficient estimate for p2 is negative. Both coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, in the full form as well as all reduced forms. Our 
results suggest that founders with low levels of ownership engage in more frequent sell 
transactions and sell a larger fraction of their holdings than do founders with high levels 
of ownership. This is consistent with the diversification effect dominating at low levels of 
ownership and loyalty effect dominating at high levels of ownership. 
As a robustness test, we also estimate our models using a balanced subset of the 
data (a complete panel with no missing observations). The results, reported in columns 3 
14
 In these and subsequent tests, we have also controlled for the differences between venture-backed and 
non-venture backed firms. The results, reported in Appendix B, suggest that there is no difference between 
the two subsamples. In addition, we also controlled for the differences between various degrees of 
founders' involvement in the management and governance of the firm (e.g., founder-CEO, founder-CEO-
and-chairman, etc) and found no significant differences between them. 
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and 4 of Table 3, suggest that our initial results are robust to potential biases due to an 
unbalanced panel. 
5.2 Information asymmetry and ownership 
This section examines the relation between ownership and the level of 
information about the firm in the equity market. We do that by estimating the following 
regression: 
INF_ASYMi = p0 +j31FAMOWNf + P2FAMOWNSQi +j33WEDGEi + J34LMKTt +jB5JNTANGl 
+ P6RDSALESi+p1LEVERi+PKYEAR_DUMMIESi+pLIND_DUMMIESi+£i ' 
We measure information asymmetry between the firm and the market, INF_ASYM in 
two different ways. Dispersion in analysts' forecasts, DISP, is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of analysts' forecasts to the stock price on the day before the forecast report 
date. Forecast error, FORERR, is the ratio of the absolute difference between actual and 
the mean forecast of earnings to the stock price on the day before the forecast report 
date.15 We use the analyst forecasts and their standard deviation as reported by IBES for 
the last month of the fiscal year preceding the proxy statement filing date.16 Our first 
proxy for information asymmetry, DISP, measures the disagreement among analysts 
about the true value of the firm. Since this disagreement is likely to be due to the lack of 
available information about the firm, we expect that higher dispersion in analysts' 
forecasts will be associated with higher level of asymmetric information. Similarly, for 
15
 These measures of asymmetric information have been used by, among others, Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) and Thomas (2002). We also used the idiosyncratic volatility as an alternative 
measure of the level of asymmetric information about the firm in the equity market. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained with the other measures. 
As shown by O'Brien (1988), analysts overestimate future earnings at the beginning of the fiscal year 
and systematically lower them until the end of the fiscal year. This implies that analysts' forecasts for the 
last month of the fiscal year are the most accurate. Thus, by using the forecasts as of the last month of the 
fiscal year preceding the proxy statement filing date, we are minimizing the impact of the analysts' 
"optimism bias". 
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the second measure of information asymmetry, FORERR, we expect that higher error in 
analysts' forecasts will be associated with firms with higher information asymmetry. 
Following Thomas (2002) we use INTANG, RDSALES, and LEVER, as control 
variables. rNTANG is the ratio of intangible assets (COMPUSTAT data item 33) to total 
assets (COMPUSTAT data item 6), measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the 
proxy filing date. RDSALES is the ratio of R&D expense (COMPUSTAT data item 46) 
to sales (COMPUSTAT data item 12), measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding 
the proxy filing date. LEVER is the ratio of long term debt and debt in current liabilities 
to total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the proxy filing date (a 
ratio of data item 9 plus data item 34 to the sum of data items 9, 34, and 60).17 The first 
two variables control for the difficulties in forecasting associated with high growth 
companies, while the last one controls for higher volatility of earnings (which is usually 
associated with higher leverage). Finally, we also control for possible industry effect 
using industry dummies (as classified by Brav, 2000). 
Hypothesis 2A suggests that founders with low (high) levels of ownership who, as 
reported above, have a greater (lower) extent of exit, will be more (less) likely to engage 
in investor relations. Therefore, the corresponding firms should have lower (higher) 
levels of asymmetric information. As a result, we expect a negative sign for the 
coefficient estimate of Pi and a positive sign for the coefficient estimate of P2. 
The results are reported in Table 4. Consistent with our predictions, for both 
measures of information asymmetry, the coefficient estimates of Pi are found to be 
negative, while the coefficient estimates of P2 are positive. All four coefficient estimates 
17
 For firms without R&D expense on Compustat, we set R&D equal to zero. For observations where 
leverage is greater than one, LEVER is set equal to one. 
19 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. The results suggest that, in order to facilitate 
their exit, founders with low ownership try to improve the market liquidity of their stock 
by engaging in additional information disclosure. As a result, their firms are associated 
with a lower level of information asymmetry (compared to firms with high levels of 
family ownership). In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 we present results for the balanced 
panel subsample. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
In light of the relation between the level of asymmetric information and 
ownership, we now control for the influence of the level of asymmetric information on 
the extent of founders' exit. The coefficient estimates of DISP and FORERR, reported in 
Panel A of Table 5 suggest that, consistent with the prediction with Hypothesis 2B, there 
is a significant negative relation between the level of asymmetric information about the 
firm in the equity market and the extent of founders' selling. We also use two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) methodology to re-estimate the relation between the extent of founders' 
selling and ownership, controlling for a potential endogeneity problems. The results are 
reported in Panel B of Table 5. The coefficient estimates of Pi and p2 remain qualitatively 
unchanged in this alternative specification. 
5.3 Microstructure implications of founders' trading 
The negative relation between the level of asymmetric information and the extent 
of founders' trading documented above, however, does not necessarily imply a lower bid-
ask spread for firms with higher extent of founders' exit. In particular, trading is likely to 
influence both the adverse selection and inventory concerns of the market maker. In this 
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section we examine the influence of founders' trading and their ownership on the 
components of the bid-ask spread, and on the overall spread. 
5.3.1 Components of bid-ask spread, ownership, and founders' sales 
We explore the relation between the adverse selection and the inventory costs of 
trading and ownership by estimating the following two regressions: 
ADV, =PQ +plFAMOWNi + p1FAMOWNSQi + P3WEDGE, + PALMKT, 
+ p5RSD,+p6SADKA_PV + p1LMKTMKR + s, ^ ' 
INVENT, = r0 + TxFAMOWN, + r2FAMOWNSQi + y^WEDGE, + y4LMKT, 
+ y5RSD, +y6SADKA_TF, +y7LMKTMKR + y, ^ ' 
ADV is the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, estimated using Lin, 
Sanger, and Booth (LSB, 1995) model over 45 trading days ending on the day before the 
proxy statement filing date. INVENT is the LSB inventory cost component of the bid-ask 
spread and is measured over 45 trading days ending on the day before the proxy filing 
date.18 Both ADV and INVENT are estimated as a percentage of the effective spread. 
We control for possible systematic adverse selection risk using the systematic permanent 
component of price impact, SADKAPV, as computed by Sadka (2006) and the 
transitory component of price impact, SADKA_TF, to control for the systematic 
inventory risks in the market. Finally, we use LMKTMKR, the natural logarithm of one 
We have also used the Glosten and Harris (1988) model as an alternative measure of the adverse 
selection costs of trading. Our results are qualitatively unchanged in this alternative specification. For the 
sake of brevity, we only report the results corresponding to the Lin, Sanger, Booth (1995). Moreover, 
unlike Glosten and Harris (1988), LSB (1995) is a three-way decomposition, which allows us to separately 
estimate the inventory and the order processing cost components. 
19
 Both dependent variables are winsorized at zero and one. These restrictions result in a loss of 23.3% of 
observations for the regressions with ADV as the dependent variable and 15.3% of observations for the 
regressions with INVENT as the dependent variable. 
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plus the number of market makers, as reported by CRSP for the month of the proxy 
statement filing, to control for the presence of multiple market makers. 
As shown above, founders with low levels of ownership tend to reduce 
information asymmetry about their firm in the equity market, and therefore should be less 
able to time the market. As discussed in Section 3, if the founder is not timing the market, 
the adverse selection cost of. trading in the firm's equity should be low and the. 
corresponding inventory costs should be high (H3). Hence, we expect the coefficient 
estimates of Pi to be negative and yi to be positive. For founders with high levels of 
ownership (who face higher level of information asymmetry) we expect the coefficient 
estimates of P2 to be positive and 72 to be negative. 
We report the results from both equations in Table 6. For the adverse selection 
cost component of the bid-ask spread, we find that the coefficient estimate for Pi is 
negative and the coefficient estimate for P2 is positive (columns 1, 3, and 5). For the 
inventory cost component, the coefficient estimates are positive for yi and negative for y2 
(columns 2, 4, and 6). The coefficient estimates of pi and yi are statistically significant at 
the 1% level, while the coefficient estimates of P2 and y2 are statistically significant at the 
10% level. In other words, founders with low (high) levels of ownership produce lower 
(higher) adverse selection cost and higher (lower) inventory cost for market makers. A 
possible explanation for these results is the market timing ability of founders. These 
results are consistent with the notion that founders with high (low) ownership are (are 
not) timing the market. The selling behavior of founders with low levels of ownership 
reduces the adverse selection cost of trading but increases the market maker's inventory 
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costs. Founders with high levels of ownership, on the other hand, exacerbate the adverse 
selection concerns of the market makers relative to their inventory concerns. 
We use the stock price changes around the founder trading dates, to examine their 
ability to time the market. We do so by estimating the following regression equations: 
TIMING, = /?<,+ P^FAMOWN) + p2FAMOWNSQ, + P3WEDGE, + p^LMKTf + e, (5) 
PROFIT, = y0 + YiFAMOWN, + y2FAMOWNSQ, + r3WEDGEi + yALMKTt + i//t (6) 
TIMING is measured as the difference between the trading price and the closing price on 
the 10th trading day prior to the trade, divided by the closing price on the 10th trading day 
prior to the trade. PROFIT is measured as the ratio of the difference of the closing price 
on the 10 trading day after the trade and the price at the time of the trade to the price at 
the time of the trade. The first variable measures the pre-trade stock price performance, 
while the second one measures the post-trade stock price performance. FAMOWN, the 
percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the founding family, is collected from the 
proxy statement immediately preceding the insider trading date. LMKT, the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization of the firm, is measured on the day before the insider 
trading date. 
If founders with high levels of ownership are indeed able to time the market, we 
expect the coefficient estimate of P2 to be positive and 72 to be negative. For founders 
with low level of ownership, who, according to the previous findings, are less likely to 
time the market, we expect the coefficient estimate of Pi to be lower than the coefficient 
estimate of P2 and yi to be non-negative. 
The results are reported in Table 7. We find that the coefficient estimates of Pi are 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level and the coefficient estimates of P2 are 
23 
positive, but insignificant. The coefficient estimate for j \ is positive, while the coefficient 
estimate for y2 is negative. Neither of the coefficient estimates is statistically significant. 
As expected, the results suggest that founders with low levels of ownership are not timing 
the market. Founders with high levels of ownership, on the other hand, appear to time 
their transactions. They tend to sell at a higher price, relative to founders with low levels 
of ownership and their sales are followed by price declines. 
5.3.2 Liquidity, ownership, and founders' sales 
As shown above, the inventory concerns of the market maker seem to, at least 
partly, offset the reduced adverse selection concerns stemming from the lower level of 
asymmetric information about the firm in the equity market. Therefore, the overall 
influence of founder ownership on the liquidity (as measured by the bid-ask spread), is an 
empirical matter, which we examine by estimating the following regression: 
SPREAD, =J30+ pxFAMOWN, + j32FAMOWNSQt + fcWEDGE/ + faLMKT, 
+ /35RSDi+P6%_SOLDl+/37LSELLi+j3kYEAR_DUMMIESi+£i ' ' 
SPREAD, the quoted average bid-ask spread, is calculated over 45 trading days ending 
on the day before the proxy filing date.20 If the adverse selection costs of trading 
dominate the market maker's inventory costs, we expect the coefficient estimate of pi to 
be negative and the coefficient estimate P2 to be positive. If, on the other hand, the 
market maker's inventory costs dominate the adverse selection costs of trading, we 
The individual stock daily spread is constructed by averaging the spread for all transactions for the stock 
on any given trading day. We repeat our empirical tests with the effective spread, which is two times the 
difference between the trade execution price and the midquote scaled by the midquote, and find similar 
results (unreported). 
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expect the coefficient estimate of Pi to be positive and the coefficient estimate P2 to be 
negative. 
The results are reported in Table 8. We find that the coefficient estimate of pi is 
positive and the coefficient estimate of P2 is negative. All coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, we find wider spreads for firms with low 
levels -of ownership and narrower spreads for firms with high levels of ownership, 
indicating that the inventory costs of market makers seem to dominate their adverse 
selection costs. 
Consistent with previous studies, the coefficient estimates of %_SELL and 
LSOLD, P6 and P7 respectively, are found to be positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. This suggests that firms with higher levels founders' selling have wider bid-ask 
spreads as compared to firms with lower levels of founders' selling. In columns 4 and 5 
of Table 8 we report the results of the second stage results of the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regressions, which we use to control for endogeneity of the extent of founders' 
exit. Since the results remain qualitatively unchanged, we conclude that our findings are 
robust. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, using unique, hand-collected data on the evolution of ownership in 
the new public firms from IPO up to seven years after the IPO, we examine not only the 
determinants, but also the influence of the extent of founders' exit on both the firm's 
information environment and the liquidity of its stock. Our results suggest a concave 
relation between the extent of founders' exit and ownership. In other words, founders 
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with low levels of ownership tend to sell more than founders with high levels of 
ownership, indicating that the loyalty (diversification) effect dominates at high (low) 
level of ownership. 
We also find that the extent of founders' exit influences both the firm's 
information environment and the liquidity of its stock. An examination of the relation 
between the extent of founders' exit and the level of asymmetric information about the 
firm in the equity market reveals that firms with low level of family ownership (i.e., those 
with the highest extent of founders' exit) have the lowest level of information asymmetry. 
The influence of the lower levels of asymmetric information on the bid-ask 
spread, however, remains unclear. We find a convex (concave) relation between the 
adverse selection (inventory) costs of trading and family ownership. This implies that 
founders with high levels of ownership may be timing the market, while the founders 
with low levels of ownership are less likely to do so. Consistent with this, our 
examination of the founders' timing ability reveals a convex (concave) relation between 
the pre-trade (post-trade) performance and ownership. In other words, founders with low 
levels of ownership tend to sell after a (relatively) smaller price increase and their sales 
are followed by an increase in the stock price (potentially due to their exit). Founders 
with high levels of ownership, however, tend to sell after a (relatively) larger price 
increase and their sales are followed by a price decline. 
Overall, our findings suggest that the inventory concerns seem to dominate the 
adverse selection issues over the entire range of ownership. Therefore these concerns are 
the main driving force behind the observed concave relation between the bid-ask spread 
and ownership. 
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Appendix A: Spread decomposition models 
Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) 
Lin, Sanger, and Booth (LSB, 1995) method is related to the approach described 
in Huang and Stoll (1997). LSB use a regression approach to estimate the proportion of 
the effective spread that can be attributed to information asymmetry. The basic idea is 
that the quote revision reflects the adverse selection component of the spread, while the 
change in the transaction price reflects the order processing costs and bid-ask bounce. 
In the LSB model, information revealed by the trade at time t is reflected in the 
quote revisions. If Pt is the transaction price at time t, and Q, is the quote midpoint at 
time t, then Bt = i?r_, + XS^ and A, = 4_i + XSt_x, where B,_x and v4,_, are the prevailing 
bid and the ask prices at time t. X can be interpreted as the proportion of the effective 
spread due to adverse selection. St_x = Pt_x - Qt_x is one-half of the effective spread. The 
revision in the quote mid point is expressed as 
&Qt = lSt_1 + st (A. 1) 
S t = 0 V i + *t (A-2) 
where AQt=Ql-Ql_l and Q,= — - . 0 represents the order processing cost 
component of the spread, and ( l - X — 0) represents the inventory component of the bid-
ask spread. 
Glosten and Harris (1988) 
In the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, the adverse-selection, the inventory-
holding, and order-processing components, are expressed as a linear function of 
transaction volume. The model is described as follows: 
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AR = c0 AJr + Cl M t ^ + xG Jf + z± LVt + st (A. 3) 
In this case, /, is a trade indicator that equals 1 if the transaction is buyer-
initiated, and -1 if it is seller-initiated; Pt is the transaction price at time t; Vt is the 
volume traded at time t; ande, captures public information innovations and errors. In this 
model, the adverse-selection component is2(z0 +zxVt), and other components 
(inventory-holding and order-processing components) are measured as2(c0+C!^). We 
use the average transaction volume for the stock to obtain an estimate of the adverse-
selection component as a percentage of the bid-ask spread: 
**tf*iW -X100 (A. 4) 
2Cc.+fftF)«(*:l+z,.75 ' 
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Appendix B: Additional robustness tests 
Table Bl Founder trading and ownership 
The dependent variables are %_SOLD, shares sold by the founder as a percentage of shares outstanding, 
and LSELL, the natural logarithm of one plus the number of sell transactions. FAMOWN is the percentage 
of cash flow rights controlled by the founding family and is collected for the time of IPO as well as the 1st, 
3rd, 5th, and 7 year after going public. FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. VC is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one if the firm receives venture capital funding, and zero otherwise. 
FAMOWNJVC is the interaction between FAMOWN and VC. FAMOWNSQJVC is the interaction 
between FAMOWNSQ and VC. WEDGE is the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights 
controlled by the family. WEDGE_VC is the interaction between WEDGE and VC. LMKT is the natural 
log of market capitalization, measured on the day before the proxy filing date. RSD is the standard 
deviation of"the market model residual, calculated over 250 trading days ending on the day before the 
proxy filing date. The results reported in columns 1 and 2 are for the full data sample. The results reported 
in columns 3 and 4 are for the balanced data sample. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors 
are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 


















































































































Table B2 Information asymmetry and ownership 
The dependent variable reported in columns 1 and 3, DISP is the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts' 
forecasts to the stock price the day before the forecast report date. The dependent variable reported in 
columns 2 and 4, FORERR is the ratio of the absolute difference between actual earnings and mean 
forecast to the stock price the day before the forecast report date. FAMOWN is the percentage of cash flow 
rights controlled by the founding family and is collected for the time of IPO as well as the 1st, 3rd, 5 th, and 
7 year after going public. FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. VC is a dummy variable that takes 
on a value of one if the firm receives venture capital funding, and zero otherwise. FAMOWN_VC is the 
interaction between FAMOWN and VC. FAMOWNSQ_VC is the interaction between FAMOWNSQ and 
VC. WEDGE is the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by the family. 
WEDGEVC is the interaction between WEDGE and VC. LMKT is the natural log of market 
capitalization, measured on the day before the proxy filing date. INTANG is the ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the proxy filing date. RDSALES is the ratio of 
R&D expense to sales, measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the proxy filing date? LEVER is the 
ratio of long term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the proxy filing date. The results reported in columns 1 and 2 are for the full data sample. The 
results reported in columns 3 and 4 are for the balanced data sample. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) 
standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 




































































































































Table B3 Founder trading, asymmetric information, and ownership 
The dependent variables are %_SOLD, shares sold by the founder as a percentage of shares outstanding, 
and LSELL, the natural logarithm of one plus the number of sell transactions. FAMOWN is the percentage 
of cash flow rights controlled by the founding family and is collected for the time of IPO as well as the Ist, 
3rd, 5th, and 7 year after going public. FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. VC is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one if the firm receives venture capital funding, and zero otherwise. 
FAMOWN_VC is the interaction between FAMOWN and VC. FAMOWNSQJ/C is the interaction 
between FAMOWNSQ and VC. WEDGE is the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights 
controlled by the family. WEDGEVC is the interaction between WEDGE and VC.LMKT is the natural 
log of market capitalization, measured on the day before the proxy filing date. RSD is the standard 
deviation of the market model residual, calculated over 250 trading days ending on the day before the 
proxy filing date. DISP is the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts to the stock price the day 
before the forecast report date. FORERR is the ratio of the absolute difference between actual earnings and 
mean forecast to the stock price the day before the forecast report date. The results reported in columns 1 to 
4 are for the full data sample. The results reported in columns 5 and 8 are for the balanced data sample. 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 








































































































































































































































Panel B: 2SLS results 
ill 























































































FORERR -0.367 -32.294 
(2.89)*** (3.67)*** 
Intercept 0.008 0.008 0.651 0.942 
(1.04) (1.00) (1.03) (1.59) 
N 1464 1674 1496 1718 
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Table B4 Bid-ask spread decomposition and ownership 
The dependent variable reported in columns 1 and 2, ADV is the adverse selection component of the bid-
ask spread, estimated using Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) model over 45 trading days ending on the day 
before the proxy filing date. The dependent variable reported in columns 3 and 4, INVENTORY is the LSB 
inventory cost component of the bid-ask spread and is measured over 45 trading days ending on the day 
before the proxy filing date. FAMOWN is the percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the founding 
family and is collected for the time of IPO as well as the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th year after going public. 
FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. VC is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the firm 
receives venture capital funding, and zero otherwise. FAMOWNVC is the interaction between FAMOWN 
and VC. FAMOWNSQJVC is the interaction between FAMOWNSQ and VC. WEDGE is the difference 
between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by the family. WEDGEVC is the interaction 
between WEDGE and VC.LMKT is the natural log of market capitalization, measured on the day before 
the proxy filing date. RSD is the standard deviation of the market model residual, calculated over 250 
trading days ending on the day before the proxy filing date. SADKAPV is a variable measuring the 
unexpected systematic (market-wide) variations of the permanent-variable component (the adverse 
selection component of the bid-ask spread) of price impact. SADKATF is a variable measuring the 
unexpected systematic (market-wide) variations of the transitory-fixed component (the inventory cost 
component of the bid-ask spread) of price impact. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are 
used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 




























































































































































Table B5 Timing of founders' trades 
The reported results are for sell transactions. The dependent variable reported in columns 1 and 2, 
TIMING, is measured as the difference between the price at the time of the trade and the closing price on 
the 10th trading day prior to the trade, divided by the closing price on the 10th trading day prior to the trade. 
The dependent variable reported in columns 3 and 4, PROFIT, is measured as the difference between the 
closing price on the 10th trading day after the trade and the price at the time of the trade, divided by the 
price at the time of the trade. FAMOWN is the percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the founding 
family and is collected from the proxy statement immediately preceding the insider trading date. 
FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. VC is a dummy variable mat takes on a value of one if the firm 
receives venture capital funding, and zero otherwise. FAMOWNVC is the interaction between FAMOWN 
and VC. FAMOWNSQVC is the interaction between FAMOWNSQ and VC. WEDGE is the difference 
between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by the family. WEDGEVC is the interaction 
between WEDGE and VC.LMKT is the natural log of market capitalization, measured on the day before 
the insider trading date. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-


































































































Table B6 Bid-ask spread and ownership 
The dependent variable SPREAD is the quoted mean bid-ask spread calculated over 45 trading days ending 
on the day before the proxy filing date. FAMOWN is the percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the 
founding family and is collected for the time of IPO as well as the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th year after going 
public. FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. VC is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if 
the firm receives venture capital funding, and zero otherwise. FAMOWN_VC is the interaction between 
FAMOWN and VC. FAMOWNSQVC is the interaction between FAMOWNSQ and VC. WEDGE is the 
difference between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by the family. WEDGE_VC is the 
interaction between WEDGE and VC.LMKT is the natural log of market capitalization, measured on the 
day before the proxy filing date. RSD is the standard deviation of the market model residual, calculated 
over 250 trading days ending on the day before the proxy filing date. %_SOLD is shares sold by the 
founder as a percentage of shares outstanding. LSELL is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
sell transactions. The results of the second stage estimation of the Heckman selection model are reported in 
columns 4 and 5. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics 
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Table 1 Sample distribution 
Panel A. The number of family firms by proxy statement 
Proxy statement # 











Panel B. The number of post - IPO insider trades between consecutive proxy statements 
Proxy statement # 










Table 2 Summary statistics 
Panel A provides summary statistics of dependent and independent variables for the panel data part of the 
study, while Panel B summarizes dependent and independent variables for the event data part. FAMOWN 
is the percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the founding family. In Panel A family ownership is 
collected for the time of IPO as well as the 1st, 3rd, 5*, and 7th year after going public. In Panel B 
FAMOWN is collected from the proxy statement immediately preceding the insider trading date. 
FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. WEDGE is the difference between voting rights and cash flow 
rights controlled by the family. MKT is the market capitalization, measured on the day before the proxy 
filing date (in Panel A) and on the day before the transaction date (in Panel B). %_SOLD is shares sold by 
the founder as a percentage of shares outstanding. LSELL is the natural logarithm of one plus the number 
of sell transactions. DISP is the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts to the stock price the 
day before the forecast report date. FORERR is the ratio of the absolute difference between actual earnings 
and the median forecast to the stock price the day before the forecast report date. INTANG is the ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the proxy filing date. 
RDSALES is the ratio of R&D expense to sales, measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the proxy 
filing date. LEVER is the ratio of long term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets, measured at 
the end of the fiscal year preceding the proxy filing date. ADV is the adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread, estimated using Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) model over 45 trading days ending on the 
day before the proxy filing date. INVENTORY is the LSB inventory cost component of the bid-ask spread 
and is measured over 45 trading days ending on the day before the proxy filing date. RSD is the standard 
deviation of the market model residual, calculated over 250 trading days ending on the day before the 
proxy filing date. SADKAPV is a variable measuring the unexpected systematic (market-wide) variations 
of the permanent-variable component (the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread) of price 
impact. SADKAJTF is a variable measuring the unexpected systematic (market-wide) variations of the 
transitory-fixed component (the inventory cost component of the bid-ask spread) of price impact. SPREAD 
is the quoted mean bid-ask spread calculated over 45 trading days ending on the day before the proxy filing 
date. TIMING, the pre-trade stock price performance, is measured as the difference between the price at the 
time of the trade and the closing price on the 10th trading day prior to the trade, divided by the closing price 
on the 10th trading day prior to the trade. PROFIT, the post-trade stock price performance, is measured as 
the difference between the closing price on the 10* trading day after the trade and the price at the time of 
the trade, divided by the price at the time of the trade. 

















































































































































































Table 3 Founder trading and ownership 
The dependent variables are %_SOLD, shares sold by the founder as a percentage of shares outstanding, 
and LSELL, the natural logarithm of one plus the number of sell transactions. FAMOWN is the percentage 
of cash flow rights controlled by the founding family and is collected for the time of IPO as well as the 1st, 
3rd, 5*, and 7th year after going public. FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. WEDGE is the 
difference between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by the family. LMKT is the natural log of 
market capitalization, measured on the day before the proxy filing date. RSD is the standard deviation of 
the market model residual, calculated over 250 trading days ending on the day before the proxy filing date. 
All regressions include year dummies to control for a possible time trend in the market. The results 
reported in columns 1 and 2 are for the full data sample. The results reported in columns 3 and 4 are for the 
balanced data sample. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-





































































(4.23)*** (4.48)*** (4.03)*** (4.01)*** 
N 2842 2906 1655 1703 
AdjR-sq 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.11 
43 
Table 4 Information asymmetry and ownership 
The dependent variable reported in columns 1 and 3, DISP is the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts' 
forecasts to the stock price the day before the forecast report date. The dependent variable reported in 
columns 2 and 4, FORERR is the ratio of the absolute difference between actual earnings and mean 
forecast to the stock price the day before the forecast report date. FAMOWN is the percentage of cash flow 
rights controlled by the founding family and is collected for the time of IPO as well as the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 
7* year after going public. FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. WEDGE is the difference between 
voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by the family. LMKT is the natural log of market 
capitalization, measured on the day before the proxy filing date. INTANG is the ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the proxy filing date. RDSALES is the ratio of 
R&D expense to sales, measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the proxy filing date. LEVER is the 
ratio of long term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets, measured at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the proxy filing date. All regressions include year dummies to control for possible time trend in 
the market. Regressions 5 and 6 include industry dummies, based on Brav (2000). The results reported in 
columns 1 and 2 are for the full data sample. The results reported in columns 3 to 6 are for the balanced 
data sample. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DISP FORERR DISP FORERR DISP FORERR 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7 Timing of founders' trades 
The reported results are for sell transactions. The dependent variable reported in columns 1 and 2, 
TIMING, is measured as the difference between the price at the time of the trade and the closing price on 
the 10* trading day prior to the trade, divided by the closing price on the 10th trading day prior to the trade. 
The dependent variable reported in columns 3 and 4, PROFIT, is measured as the difference between the 
closing price on the 10* trading day after the trade and the price at the time of the trade, divided by the 
price at the time of the trade. FAMOWN is the percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the founding 
family and is collected from the proxy statement immediately preceding the insider trading date. 
FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. WEDGE is the difference between voting rights and cash flow 
rights controlled by the family. LMKT is the natural log of market capitalization, measured on the day 
before the insider trading date. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation 






























































Table 8 Bid-ask spread and ownership 
The dependent variable SPREAD is the quoted mean bid-ask spread calculated over 45 trading days ending 
on the day before the proxy filing date. FAMOWN is the percentage of cash flow rights controlled by the 
founding family and is collected for the time of IPO as well as the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th year after going 
public. FAMOWNSQ is family ownership squared. WEDGE is the difference between voting rights and 
cash flow rights controlled by the family. LMKT is the natural log of market capitalization, measured on 
the day before the proxy filing date. RSD is the standard deviation of the market model residual, calculated 
over 250 trading days ending on the day before the proxy filing date. %_SOLD is shares sold by the 
founder as a percentage of shares outstanding. LSELL is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
sell transactions. All regressions include year dummies to control for possible time trend in the market. The 
results of the second stage estimation of the Heckman selection model are reported in columns 4 and 5. 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(1) 
SPREAD 
OLS 
0.193 
(4.24)*** 
-0.205 
(3.22)*** 
-0.058 
(1.53) 
0.009 
(3.73)*** 
-0.822 
(5.20)*** 
(2) 
SPREAD 
OLS 
0.188 
(4.09)*** 
-0.195 
(3.05)*** 
-0.053 
(1.39) 
0.008 
(3.12)*** 
-0.809 
(5.09)*** 
(3) 
SPREAD 
OLS 
0.163 
(3.46)*** 
-0.171 
(2.63)*** 
-0.057 
(1.50) 
0.009 
(3.64)*** 
-0.809 
(5.08)*** 
0.552 
(2.78)*** 
(4) 
SPREAD 
2SLS 
0.208 
(3.76)*** 
-0.263 
(3.37)*** 
-0.099 
(2.16)** 
0.003 
(1.01) 
-1.525 
(6.49)*** 
(5) 
SPREAD 
2SLS 
0.210 
(3.80)*** 
-0.264 
(3.41)*** 
-0.097 
(2.08)** 
0.003 
(0.99) 
-1.516 
(6.42)*** 
0.012 
(3.03)*** 
yes 
-0.018 
(0.51) 
2714 
0.37 
0.008 
(2.44)** 
yes 
-0.011 
(0.31) 
2714 
0.37 
yes 
-0.017 
(0.49) 
2653 
0.38 
0.687 
(3.02)** 
yes 
0.054 
(1.13) 
1682 
FAMOWN 
FAMOWNSQ 
WEDGE 
LMKT 
RSD 
%_SOLD 
LSELL 
Year dummies 
Intercept 
N 
Adj R-sq 
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